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Thursday, July 23, 2020 | History

2 edition of Conjectural variation and the indeterminancy of Duopolistic equilibria found in the catalog.

Conjectural variation and the indeterminancy of Duopolistic equilibria

by Charles D. Kolstad

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  • 32 Currently reading

Published by College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in [Urbana, Ill.] .
Written in English


Edition Notes

Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-31).

StatementCharles D. Kolstad, Frank A. Wolak
SeriesBEBR faculty working paper -- no. 1084, BEBR faculty working paper -- no. 1084.
ContributionsWolak, Frank A., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. College of Commerce and Business Administration
The Physical Object
Pagination31, [8] p. :
Number of Pages31
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL25105881M
OCLC/WorldCa742059213

Charles D. Kolstad and Frank A. Wolak Conjectural variation and the indeterminacy of duopolistic equilibria Leslie Young A note on 'Sector specific capital, interconnectedness in production, and welfare' David J. Salant Equilibrium in a spatial model of imperfect competition with sequential choice of locations and quantities. Determinacy and Indeterminacy of Equilibria Abstract This essay discusses work on the determinacy and indeterminacy of equilibrium in models of competitive markets. Determinacy typically refers to situations in which equilibria are finite in number, and local comparative statics can be precisely described. This essay describes basic.

a unique consistent conjectural variation between -1 and 0, and the other in which there are two consistent conjectural variations, -1 and one which is positive. Using (6), the consistency condition (7) can be written in terms of X, 6, and m as either: See Perry () or Seade () for basic treatments of the conjectural variation model.   Similarly, A* = dq/dq* is the corresponding conjectural variation for firm 2. By assuming both the second-order and stability conditions (see Dixit, , and Seade, ) to be satisfied so that the global uniqueness of the equilibrium exists, we can solve for the equilibrium levels of q and q* as a function of x, x* and a.

"Imperfectly Competitive Equilibria in International Commodity Markets," Amer. J. Agric. Econ., 68(1) (), with A. Burris. "Conjectural Variation and the Indeterminacy of Duopolistic Equilibria," Canadian J. Economics, () with F. Wolak. "Empirical Properties of Economic Incentives and Command-and-Control Regulations for. Downloadable (with restrictions)! We study a mixed duopoly model, in which a state-owned (public) firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private (foreign) firm compete. Under general enough assumptions, we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE) applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent.


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Conjectural variation and the indeterminancy of Duopolistic equilibria by Charles D. Kolstad Download PDF EPUB FB2

Discoversomeempirically appealing properties of the Bresnahan/Laitneroligopoly equilibrium. Inthe empirical analysisweintroduce a new decision variable. Conjectural variation and the indeterminancy of Duopolistic equilibria. By Charles D. Kolstad and Frank A.

Wolak. Get PDF (2 MB) Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) Publisher: Urbana, Ill.: Bureau of Economic and Business Research. College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Author: Charles D.

Kolstad and Frank A. Wolak. Download PDF: Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s): ?si (external link)Author: Charles D. Kolstad and Frank A. Wolak. A s a consequence, the conjectural nature of the duopolistic indeterminacy had to be “rediscovered” by Pigou in Exactly in the same year another British economist, A.

B owley. This paper covers the debate on the conjectural variations approach to duopolistic competition in the period from to The focus is on the evolution of. The paper covers the – debate on the conjectural variations approach to duopoly theory and focuses on the evolution of economists' views about the imposition of a consistency condition on the firms' conjectures.

This paper covers the debate on the conjectural variations approach to duopolistic competition in the period from to The focus is on the evolution of economists' views about the imposition of a consistency condition upon firms' conjectures in order to obtain a determinate solution to the duopoly model.

To fully understand the impacts and policy implications of conjectural variation, one must first understand the part it played in the great indeterminacy debate within marginal economics during. Conjectural Variations The earliest models of oligopolistic behavior assumed that firms formed expectations about the reactions (or variations) of other firms, now called conjectural variations.

The Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg models can be interpreted as conjectural variations models rather than as game theory models. The topic of conjectural variations in oligopolistic markets has been investigated for a long time; for example, Bresnahan [1], Perry [2], Boyer and Moreaux [3], Tanaka [4], and Tanaka [5] considered the influence of the conjectural variations of firms on the equilibrium market outcomes in several economic contexts.

1 More recently, in a. We study a mixed duopoly model, in which a state-owned (public) firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private (foreign) firm compete. Under general enough assumptions, we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium (CVE) applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent.

the importance of knowing the conjectural variation can be further reduced. We first examine the indeterminacy of equilibria from a, theoretical perspective, using a static conjectural variation duopoly model assuming identical cost functions for the two firms.

Using this model we define a mea. Explain ‘conjectural variation’ in Cournot duopoly, evaluate its impacts and discuss the policy implication To fully understand the impacts and policy implications of conjectural variation, one must first understand the part it played in the great indeterminacy debate within marginal economics during the first half of the 20th century.

Conjectural Variation and the Indeterminacy of Duopolistic Equilibria Canadian Journal of Economics,19, (4), View citations (4) Empirical Properties of Economic Incentives and Command-and-Control Regulations for Air Pollution Control Land Economics,62, (3), View citations (23).

Conjectural variations in oligopolistic markets have been investigated for a long time. For example, Bresnahan [1], Perry [2], Boyer and Moreaux [3], Tanaka [4], and Tanaka [5] considered the effects of the conjectural variations of firms on equilibrium market outcomes in several economic contexts 1.

conjectural variations in oligopolistic markets has been investigated for a long time; for example, Bresnahan [1], Perry [2], Boyer and Moreaux [3], Tanaka [4], and Ta- naka [5] considered the influence of the conjectural vari-ations of firms on the equilibrium market outcomes in several economic contexts.

More recently, in a private. Downloadable. To fully understand the impacts and policy implications of conjectural variation, one must first understand the part it played in the great indeterminacy debate within marginal economics during the first half of the 20th century.

Therefore, this paper shall begin with a short description and history of conjectural variation, followed by how the debates surrounding it led to the. Conjectural Variation and the Indeterminacy of Duopolistic Equilibria November Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d`Economique Charles D.

Kolstad. literature on the conjectural variation approach to modeling oligopoly behavior. The price conjectural variation is a firm's anticipated response from a rival firm if the firm changes its price.

Depending upon the anticipated response, the resulting equilibrium price and output configuration can range from the competitive to monopolistic. conjectural variation and the indeterminacy of duopolistic equilibria canadian journal of economics-revue canadienne d economique kolstad, c.

d., wolak, f. ; 19 (4): View details for Web of Science ID AF. Four kinds of results are obtained. Firstly, the equilibrium prices and level of activity decrease with the conjectural variations parameter. Secondly, the economy may have three symmetric general equilibria. Thirdly, these symmetric equilibria can be Pareto-ranked by the conjectural variations parameter.

By comparing those equilibria, we show that the steady state feedback as well as open-loop Nash equilibria of the dynamic contribution game almost coincide with the conjectural variations (or Nash) equilibria of the corresponding static model, when the rates of time preference and of depreciation are sufficiently close to zero and one.of the Nash equilibrium solution like Selten’s subgame perfect equilibrium () and perfect equilibrium (), Harsanyi’s Bayesian Nash equilibrium (), or Kreps and Wilson’s sequential equilibrium () have proved essential to the modern analysis of the indeterminacy .